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The duty on the Betfair exchange did not arise.

The duty he would allow is aimed only at a severe disorder that could be foreseen. On 5 March the monthly deposit limit went from £10 to £5,000. That is 500 times, and the multiple is this paper's.

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The judgment
[2026] EWHC 2935 (KB), Mr Justice Swift, King's Bench. Case KB-2024-001178. Handed down remotely at 2pm on 13 November 2026, by email to the parties and by release to the National Archives. Hearing on 4 and 5 June, 8 to 12 June, and 15 to 19 June 2026.
The parties
Ann-Marie Ashton, for the estate of Luke Ashton, and two further family claimants, one a minor acting by his mother. Leigh Day for the claimants, led by Jeremy Hyam KC. Keystone Law for TSE Malta LP, led by Jonathan Hough KC. The judgment says Betfair is the trading name the defendant uses. SBC News calls the exchange a Flutter Entertainment brand.
The test
A duty to act against gambling disorder only in its severe form, and only when that form could be foreseen. Foreseeable, on this formulation, with notice of a diagnosis in any degree, or with behaviour so extreme that the gambling is wholly outside the customer's control. The step then required is to stop the service. On these facts the duty did not arise. The claim is dismissed.
March on the exchange
Just over £7,000 deposited and just over £5,600 lost. The monthly deposit limit opened at £10, rose to £5,000 on 5 March, returned to £10 on 10 March, came off on 20 March, and was reset at £10 a day on 30 March. From 20 to 30 March, bets every day, 64 a day on average, and at least four hours a day on the site. Four automated safer-gambling messages. This desk did not open the account log.
The code
Gambling Act 2005, section 24(8). Failing to follow a code provision does not, by itself, create criminal or civil liability. The judge treats that as a reason the common law should not simply adopt the Commission's standards. In November 2021 the Commission decided no action was required. This desk did not open the later coroner's report.

The High Court in London has dismissed a negligence claim against the company that runs the Betfair exchange. Mr Justice Swift handed the judgment down remotely at 2pm on 13 November 2026. The neutral citation is [2026] EWHC 2935 (KB), case KB-2024-001178. SBC News reported the result on 16 November. The account below is from the approved judgment, which this desk opened on the National Archives, and from section 24 of the Gambling Act 2005, which this desk also opened. SBC describes the exchange as a Flutter Entertainment brand. The judgment names the defendant as TSE Malta LP and says Betfair is the trading name that company uses.

The claimants are Ann-Marie Ashton, for herself and for the estate, and two other members of the family, one of them a minor acting through his mother. The claim is in negligence, under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. Mr Ashton died by suicide on 22 April 2021. He was 40. The pleaded case is that he had a gambling disorder, that the operator’s negligence drove it into a severe form, and that the distress from that sat at the centre of his decision. The periods in focus are June and July 2019, and the first four months of 2021. The hearing sat on 4 and 5 June, from 8 to 12 June, and from 15 to 19 June 2026. Leigh Day acted for the claimants. Keystone Law acted for the defendant.

The shape of the duty moved during the hearing. The judge says that shift is not a criticism, in a case he places at the edge of negligence. In opening, counsel for the claimants drew on the employer’s duty in psychiatric-injury cases, as the Court of Appeal set it out in Hatton v Sutherland. By the closing submissions the duty was a duty to answer a risk to health once the operator was, or ought to have been, on notice that Mr Ashton might be at risk of a gambling disorder. That notice, on the claimants’ case, came from his activity in February and March 2021. The standard they then asked for was the Gambling Commission’s social responsibility code. On these facts, they said, the code required a phone call first, so the operator could learn why he was gambling and help him see it.

The judge does not accept a duty built by tracing the code. What he would allow is narrower. It is a duty to act against gambling disorder only in its severe form, and only when that severe form could be foreseen. A customer may choose badly, in deciding to gamble at all or in how far to go, and the freedom to make that choice carries real weight. The contract is not a contract of employment. Nothing in it obliges the customer to gamble, and the operator does not set when or where the play happens. A log of bets, run through safer-gambling controls, does not turn the relationship into one of employment. Holding that log is not the same as foreseeing a psychiatric injury. A diagnosis depends on more than a pattern in the stakes. The judgment points to a different Betfair case, Gibson v TSE Malta, where the customer was a VIP and a specialist team stayed in regular contact. That is not this relationship. Mr Ashton used a website.

On that formulation, foreseeability is a hard test. A reasonable operator would see a severe disorder, and would have to act, in two situations. One is notice of a diagnosis, whether mild, moderate or severe. The other is behaviour so extreme that it shows the gambling is wholly outside the customer’s control, the line Briggs J drew in Calvert. Where the test is met, the step required is to stop offering gambling to that customer. The judge is clear that this is not the whole of an operator’s legal exposure. The part of Calvert that succeeded was a failure to honour a request to self-exclude. A similar case now, he says, might sit better in contract. The contracts already fold in some of the safer-gambling tools.

The code is a poor mould for the duty, for reasons he ties to the statute. Section 24(8) says that failing to comply with a provision of a code does not, of itself, make a person liable to criminal or civil proceedings. That is subject to any part of the Act that makes an exception to an offence depend on compliance with a code. The judge reads subsection (8) as short of a complete bar, and still as a reason the common law should not simply take over the Commission’s standards. Doing that would put the court in the regulator’s chair. Paragraph 3.4.1 of the code tells licence holders to identify customers who are, or may be, experiencing harms associated with gambling, and to interact with them. He says that phrase is not confined to a recognised psychiatric illness. Regulation also starts when a customer first gambles. It asks operators to encourage responsible play, to offer tools, to watch the account and to discourage excess. A duty in tort, on his account, belongs where a genuine and informed choice has run out. Most people who gamble do not develop the disorder. DSM-5, the manual the experts used, puts the rate in the general population at 0.2 to 0.3 percent. The evidence accepted at trial was that fewer than 1 percent of people who gamble are affected. Choosing to gamble is choosing to take that known risk. Mild or moderate disorder, in this judgment, still leaves the customer with some responsibility for dealing with it.

The betting record was largely common ground. The dispute was about what to make of it. Mr Ashton had gambled online since 2009, across accounts with more than one company. On those accounts together, the judgment records deposits of £2,600 in 2016, £2,800 in 2017, £6,000 in 2018, £15,000 in 2019, £4,600 in 2020, and £10,600 in the first four months of 2021. Losses on the same accounts were about £1,000, then £1,200, £2,500, £11,100, £2,600 and £7,500. In the year to April 2021 his earnings and his wife’s came to a little under £57,000. In 2019 his wife found a debt of £18,000, mainly from online bets on horse races. She believed he had stopped, and that the debt was gone by early 2020. The trial evidence was that he cut his gambling for the rest of 2019 and through 2020, and that the loans were still being serviced rather than paid off.

In 2019, 2020 and 2021 he gambled mainly, if not entirely, on the Betfair exchange. An exchange is not a sportsbook. Customers are matched with each other. The operator does not stand as the counterparty and does not take the risk of the bet. It is paid a commission by the winner. Richard Clarke, a managing director employed by Betfair Limited, gave evidence that was not disputed. The product needs its own Commission licence, a remote betting intermediary operating licence. The claim is about that product, not about a traditional book.

On the defendant’s records, June and July 2019 brought deposits of some £6,200 and losses of about £5,000. From January to April 2021 the deposits were a little over £9,800 and the losses just under £7,500. March 2021 alone was just over £7,000 deposited and just over £5,600 lost. The monthly deposit limit opened the month at £10. On 5 March he raised it to £5,000. Dividing the second figure by the first gives 500. That multiple is this paper’s. On 10 March he put the limit back to £10 a month, where it stayed until 20 March, when he removed it. No limit applied until 30 March, when he set £10 a day. That daily cap lasted until 11 April, when he moved it to £10 a week. From 20 to 30 March he bet every day, 64 bets a day on average, and spent at least four hours a day on the site, often from early in the day into the evening. After the limit came off, the judgment lists £295 on 20 March, £600 on 23 March, £1,000 on 24 March, £30 and £700 on 26 March, and £510 on 29 March. It says the bank records suggested the £1,000 was borrowed from a commercial lender. This desk did not open those records. In March he received four automated safer-gambling messages. The one on 6 March followed the amount deposited. The ones on 11, 25 and 27 March followed time on the site. The judgment does not record a phone call in that month.

He was never diagnosed with a gambling disorder while he was alive. Both medical experts read his records. They contain no mention of a gambling problem, of a mental disorder, or of treatment for one. In 2019 he was prescribed amitriptyline, in a small dose, for neuropathic pain rather than as treatment for depression. Dr John Barker, for the claimants, worked from the betting record after the death. His opinion was that eight of the nine DSM-5 criteria were met, the missing one being restlessness or irritability when trying to cut down, and that the disorder was at its most severe in April 2021 and was already present, and worsening, from 18 April 2018. Dr Humphrey Needham-Bennett, for the defendant, scored two criteria as met, one as possible, one as not met, and five as lacking evidence. Four are needed before the manual will call a disorder mild. His point, which the judge accepts, is that the criteria are mostly about what the person thinks and feels, and a betting log does not supply that. The judge prefers that evidence. There is not enough to find that Mr Ashton had a gambling disorder. If a finding is required, the judge’s is that he did not have any form of it inside the DSM-5 criteria. It follows that, from July 2019 to April 2021, the operator did not know and ought not to have known. The duty the claim depended on did not arise.

Further views on the standard of care are, he says, academic, and he keeps them short. The industry experts, Professor David Forrest for the claimants and David Clifton for the defendant, were asked whether the systems met the code and the Commission’s guidance. That question assumes the wrong yardstick. On the duty as he formulates it, the answer to a foreseeable severe disorder is to stop the service. He does not work through their evidence in detail. He does record that the death led the Commission to look at compliance, and that in November 2021 it decided no action was required. After the inquest the coroner sent a Prevention of Future Deaths report and set out a concern that the player-protection tools had been inadequate. The Commission replied that it meant to look again in light of what the coroner had found. This desk did not open that report or that reply. The judgment’s point is that the social-responsibility provisions state general principles for a wide notion of harm. They matter for public safety. They are the wrong place to start a tort claim of this kind. Causation, and any share of fault on the customer’s side, were left where they stood.

Sources

  1. High Court, Ashton v TSE Malta LP, [2026] EWHC 2935 (KB), 13 November 2026
  2. Gambling Act 2005, section 24
  3. SBC News, 16 November 2026